Kursk Down Read online

  What really did sink the Kursk?

  Will we ever know?

  The answer to both questions is yes.

  The real cause of the Kursk disaster is clear.

  PART III

  THE LESSON

  WHAT REALLY SANK THE KURSK !

  A single word defines the force that actually sank the Kursk.

  That word is “attitude.”

  As history has proven, it is far easier to strive to regain old glories than accept new realities. In brief, that’s the story of Russian military management since the fall of the Soviet Union.

  Under the old regime, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics attained a position of world power based solely upon its military might.

  Behind that warrior shield, which was often made from smoke and mirrors, there was no infrastructure to support the nation’s claim to greatness.

  The Russian road system was abominable. Other means of transportation were inadequate. The agricultural capabilities were consistently unable to sustain the population. Russian manufacturing potential was far beneath the people’s needs. Health-care facilities were marginal. Housing was substandard as well as crowded. Sanitation facilities were stressed to the maximum. And Russian educational efforts had become sorely limited.

  Human rights were dismissed, and each individual became, in too real a sense, a ward of the state. So the family unit was placed in a secondary role and religion was relegated to the status of a barely tolerated anachronism.

  These were the inadequacies in their major cities and most heavily populated areas. The situation was worse out in the boondocks.

  To sustain world power, the leadership of the USSR played upon the fear of being invaded, utilized nationalism as a force to unify a diverse people as well as instill a distrust for foreigners, and hid the lifestyle deficiencies created by applying as much of the national productivity as possible to maintaining its military might.

  Under Soviet control, the once proud scientific community was instructed to direct its internationally renowned capabilities to military purposes.

  All art forms—in essence the nation’s total creative effort—came under the watchful eye of government approval. It was also harnessed to pull the cart of nationalism.

  And to ensure a positive image for the government among the people, continue support of military excesses, and sustain fear of foreign aggression, news sources were tightly controlled.

  In short, the USSR was a nation in which the total possible output, aside from the barest essential needs of the populace, was devoted to maintaining a position of world importance through military strength. With this intense focus on arms and armaments, it was no wonder the highest echelon of military leaders gained and nurtured a degree of selfimportance along with an attitude of arrogant superiority.

  At the Soviet Union’s demise, these leaders were, for the first time, faced with a rechanneling of national output because of a fresh positioning of government. In the new era of the Russian Federation, military needs, once the master, were relegated to a subservient status.

  To claim that this was difficult for many to accept is an understatement of massive proportions.

  The concept that military force was no longer the driving reason for the nation’s existence was, to many in the officer corps, unthinkable, unendurable, and unwise.

  Yet it happened.

  To regain past glories, which is also to say previous funding levels, the military has actively carried on a campaign to rekindle public fears of foreign acts of aggression. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been cast by some as a loaded cannon pointed at the heart of the motherland. And only the threat of quick and dire retaliation has kept that cannon from being fired. Others have engaged in open warfare against former Soviet Union citizenry now labeled “rebels.”

  The military has yet to find, however, the right appeal to the people that will result in a demand to return the nation’s money box to rearmament needs.

  A country that has based its place in the ranks of the world’s greatest powers on the threat and strength of its military capabilities must continue to demonstrate those capabilities. In the case of Russia’s Northern Fleet, the annual sea maneuvers were one such demonstration. The much vaunted Mediterranean cruise, to show the world Russia’s level of sea power, was another.

  Demonstration of military abilities is always a dangerous and expensive game. And the danger increases exponentially as the ability to adequately fund such activities declines.

  Because of their intended use, modern weapons systems, no matter how diligent the designers, are unsafe. The task of the system is to deliver destructive force on a designated target. To accomplish that goal, the system itself must contain the force to be delivered. And that force, regardless of the number of fail-safe checks imposed, is capable of self-ignition.

  Due to this inherent destructive ability, the safe handling and firing of modern weapons systems requires extensive early training followed by constant practice with live ammunition and/or warheads. Allowing budgetary constraints to shorten the initial training or reduce practice time or dictate use of weaponry with less than the maximum available safety checks is a prelude to catastrophe.

  To short safety in a period of depleted budgets and then demand performance equal or superior to that attained during times of sufficient funding is dancing with disaster.

  The Russian bear, led by the military and especially the Navy, did that dance. And the Kursk disaster paid the fiddler.

  It is easier, and probably more satisfying, to strive to regain old glories than accept new realities.

  That attitude sank the Kursk.

  That posture will continue to plague what can become a great nation on its considerable merits as opposed to lost military might.

  EPILOGUE

  MORE THAN A YEAR HAS PASSED SINCE THE SINKING OF THEKursk. And the story is still making headlines.

  Worldwide interest was rekindled in late summer and early fall of 2001 with the commencement of a longpromised operation to raise the lost submarine.

  First statements about bringing up the Kursk indicated the purpose was to return the bodies of the lost seamen to their families. In practice, another goal, salvaging the boat’s center and tail sections to recover the nuclear reactors and missiles, appears to have gained equal importance.

  The bow segment, where the explosions occurred, and where there is reportedly recognizable missile damage, has been sliced off and left behind. Supposedly the Navy will retrieve it “at a later date.” This is doubly strange because without careful examination of the bow segment there is no hope of defining what caused the disaster. And that knowledge is important to the future operation of other Russian submarines. As an aside, one story indicates that the cut to sever the bow from the rest of the boat was to be made at the point on the hull that was identified in a report as being the missile’s point of impact.

  To defend leaving the bow section, official concerns over the possibility of unexploded torpedoes were revealed. This is a strange position: first, because divers have explored the bow space, and undoubtedly political and military officials know what is inside. So there is no need for supposition about “possible” unexploded torpedoes. And second, had there been any real fear of another explosion, the mission to enter the sunken submarine in October 2000, to search for bodies, would never have taken place. Even one unexploded torpedo would have endangered the small flotilla at the disaster site and the divers cutting entry holes through the hulls. No mention was made then of such a potential hazard.

  None of this is to imply that the recovery of the nuclear reactors and weapons is not beneficial. The cleanup is both necessary and prudent. For the Russians, it also reduces the opportunity for foreign intelligence missions to examine those items.

  One final interesting fact has been revealed. Igor Spassky, head academician of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, was quoted in an article in Itar-Tass as stating that Russia is develo
ping a fourth-generation submarine. And the forces that destroyed the Kursk are being considered in mapping its new design. From that comment, it is difficult not to believe that those in charge, despite statements about being unsure, know exactly what went wrong in those final, fatal moments.

  In closing, it is appropriate to express sincere condolences to the families who lost loved ones in this tragic catastrophe—and to honor those who perished by including their names in this book.

  CREW MEMBERS

  Compartment 1

  1. Senior Warrant Officer Abdulkadyr ILDAROV—torpedo crew petty officer (Dagestan Rep.)

  2. Warrant Officer Aleksey ZUBOV—sonar group technician (Ukraine)

  3. Seaman Ivan NEFEDKOV—torpedo section commander (Sverdlovsk Reg.)

  4. Seaman Maxim BORZHOV—torpedoman (Vladimir Reg.)

  5. Seaman Aleksey SHULGIN—bilge mechanic (Arkhangelsk Reg.)

  6. Senior Lieutenant Arnold BORISOV—representative from the Dagdizel Plant (not a member of the crew) (Dagestan Rep.)

  7. Mamed GADZHIYEV—representative from the Dagdizel Plant (not a member of the crew) (Dagestan Rep.)

  Compartment 2

  7th Submarine Division Headquarters

  1. Captain (1st Rank) Vladimir BAGRYANTSEV—chief of 7th Submarine Division Staff (Crimea Rep.)

  2. Captain (2nd Rank) Yury SHEPETNOV—missile flag officer (Crimea Rep.)

  3. Captain (2nd Rank) Viktor BELOGUN—electromechanical service deputy chief (Ukraine)

  4. Captain (2nd Rank) Vasily ISAYENKO—electromechanical group assistant to chief (Crimea Rep.)

  5. Captain (3rd Rank) Marat BAIGARIN—temporary acting torpedo flag officer (St. Petersburg)

  Crew

  6. Captain (1st Rank) Gennadi LYACHIN—Kursk commander (Volgograd Reg.)

  7. Captain (2nd Rank) Sergey DUDKO—first officer (Byelorussia)

  8. Captain (2nd Rank) Alexander SHUBIN—deputy commander for training (Crimea Rep.)

  9. Captain-Lieutenant Maxim SAFONOV—navigation officer (Moscow Reg.)

  10. Senior Lieutenant Sergey TYLIK—electrical navigation group commander (Murmansk Reg.)

  11. Senior Lieutenant Vadim BUBNIV—electrical navigation group engineer (Ulyanovsk Reg.)

  12. Captain (3rd Rank) Andrey SILOGAVA—missile officer (Crimea Rep.)

  13. Captain-Lieutenant Aleksey SHEVCHUK—control party of missile department commander (Murmansk Reg.)

  14. Senior Lieutenant Andrey PANARIN—control party of missile department engineer (Leningrad Reg.)

  15. Senior Lieutenant Boris GELETIN—launch party of missile department commander (Murmansk Reg.)

  16. Senior Lieutenant Sergey UZKIY—target designation group commander (Arkhangelsk Reg.)

  17. Captain (2nd Rank) Yury SABLIN—engineering officer (Crimea Rep.)

  18. Captain (3rd Rank) Andrey MILYUTIN—damagecontrol commander (St. Petersburg)

  19. Captain-Lieutenant Sergey KOKURIN—bilge party of damage-control division commander (Voronezh Reg.)

  20. Warrant Officer Vladimir KHIVUK—mustering technician (Kursk Reg.)

  21. Captain (3rd Rank) Alexander SADKOV—combat control commander (Amur Reg.)

  22. Captain-Lieutenant Mikhail RODIONOV—computer group commander (Crimea Rep.)

  23. Senior Lieutenant Sergey YERAKHTIN—computer group engineer (Murmansk Reg.)

  24. Warrant Officer Yakov SAMOVAROV—medical unit chief (Arkhangelsk Reg.)

  25. Senior Warrant Officer Alexander RUZLYEV—ship’s boatswain (Murmansk Reg.)

  26. Warrant Officer Konstantin KOZYREV—electrical navigation group first technician (Murmansk Reg.)

  27. Senior Warrant Officer Vladimir FESAK—electrical navigation group second technician (Ukraine)

  28. Warrant Officer Andrey POLYANSKY—electrical navigation group third technician (Krasnodar Reg.)

  29. Warrant Officer Sergey KISLINSKY—launch party of missile department technician (Kostroma Reg.)

  30. Warrant Officer Sergey GRYAZNYKH—computer group technician (Arkhangelsk Reg.)

  31. Seaman Dmitry MIRTOV—steering signalman (Komi Rep.)

  32. Petty officer (2nd class) Dmitry LEONOV—steering signalmen unit commander (Moscow Reg.)

  33. Senior Lieutenant Maxim RVANIN—electrical technical group engineer (Arkhangelsk Reg.)

  34. Seaman Andrey DRYUCHENKO—electrician (Arkhangelsk Reg.)

  35. Senior Lieutenant Aleksey IVANOV-PAVLOV—torpedo officer (Ukraine)

  36. Warrant Officer Viktor PONOMARENKO—sonar group technician (Ukraine)

  Compartment 3

  1. Captain-Lieutenant Dmitry REPNIKOV—second-incommand (Crimea Rep.)

  2. Captain (3rd Rank) Andrey RUDAKOV—signal officer (Moscow Reg.)

  3. Captain-Lieutenant Sergey FITERER—automatic space communications group commander (Kaliningrad Reg.)

  4. Captain-Lieutenant Oleg NOSIKOVSKY—classified automatic communications group commander (Kaliningrad Reg.)

  5. Captain-Lieutenant Vitaly SOLOREV—equipment party of damage-control division commander (Bryansk Reg.)

  6. Captain-Lieutenant Sergey LOGINOV—sonar group commander (Ukraine)

  7. Senior Lieutenant Andrey KOROVYAKOV—sonar group first engineer (St. Petersburg)

  8. Senior Lieutenant Aleksey KOROBKOV—sonar group second engineer (Murmansk Reg.)

  9. Senior Lieutenant Alexander GUDKOV—radio intelligence group commander (Kaliningrad Reg.)

  10. Captain (3rd Rank) Vyacheslav BEZSOKIRNY— chemicals service chief (Ukraine)

  11. Senior Warrant Officer Igor YERASOV—cryptographer (Voronezh Reg.)

  12. Senior Warrant Officer Vladimir SVECHKARYEV— classified automatic communications telegraph operator (Nizhny Novogorod Reg.)

  13. Senior Warrant Officer Sergey KALININ—missile department classified automatic communications telegraph operator (Ukraine)

  14. Senior Warrant Officer Igor FEDORICHEV—control department technician (Tula Reg.)

  15. Warrant Officer Maxim VISHNYAKOV—target designation group technician (Ukraine)

  16. Warrant Officer Sergey CHERNYSHOV—space communications telegraph operator (Crimea Rep.)

  17. Warrant Officer Mikhail BELOV—sonar group technician (Nizhny Novogorod Reg.)

  18. Warrant Officer Pavel TAVOLZHANSKY—sonar group techinican (Belgorod Reg.)

  19. Senior Warrant Officer Sergey VLASOV—radio intelligence group technician (Murmansk Reg.)

  20. Warrant Officer Sergey RYCHKOV—chemicals service technician (Uzbekistan)

  21. Petty Officer (2nd class) Yury ANENKOV—missile department mechanic (Kursk Reg.)

  22. Seaman Dmitry KOTKOV—missile department mechanic (Vologda Reg.)

  23. Seaman (backup) Nikolai PAVLOV—missile department mechanic (Voronezh Reg.)

  24. Seaman Ruslan TRYANICHEV—bilge mechanic (Vologda Reg.)

  Compartment 4

  1. Senior Lieutenant Denis KIRICHENKO—damagecontrol engineer (Ulyanovsk Reg.)

  2. Captain Aleksey STANKEVICH—medical service chief (Ukraine, St. Petersburg)

  3. Warrant Officer Vitaly ROMANYUK—surgeon’s assistant (Crimea Rep.)

  4. Senior Warrant Officer Vasily KICHKIRUK—medics team petty officer (Ukraine)

  5. Senior Warrant Officer Anatoly BELYAEV—senior ship’s cook (instructor) (Ryazan Reg.)

  6. Chief Petty Officer of the ship Salovat YANSAPOV— ship’s cook (instructor) (Bashkortostan Rep.)

  7. Seaman Sergey VITCHENKO—cook (Leningrad Reg.)

  8. Seaman Oleg YEVDOKIMOV—cook (Kursk Reg.)

  9. Seaman Dmitry STAROSELTSEV—bilge seaman (Kursk Reg.)

  10. Seaman Alexander KHALENO—turbine operator (backup) (Komi Rep.)

  11. Seaman Aleksey KOLOMEITSEV—turbine operator (backup) (Komi Rep.)

  12. Seaman Igor LOGINOV—turbine operator (backup) (Komi Rep.)

  Compartment 5

  1. Captain (3rd Rank) Dmitry MURACHYOV—main propulsion division commander (Crimea Rep.)


  2. Captain-Lieutenant Denis PSHENICHNIKOV—remote control group commander (first) (Crimea Rep.)

  3. Captain-Lieutenant Sergey LYUBUSHKIN—remote control group commander (second) (Nizhny Novgorod Reg.)

  4. Captain (3rd Rank) Ilya SHCHAVINSKY—electrical division commander (St. Petersburg)

  5. Captain-Lieutenant Andrey VASILYEV—equipment party of main propulsion division commander (Crimea Rep.)

  6. Captain (3rd Rank) Nikolai BELOZYOROV—electricaltechnical group commander (Voronezh Reg.)

  7. Senior Warrant Officer Ivan TSYMBAL—electrician (Ukraine)

  8. Warrant Officer Oleg TROYAN—chemical service technician (Azerbaijan)

  9. Senior Petty Officer Alexander NEUSTROYEV—electrician (Tomsk Reg.)

  10. Seaman Aleksey LARIONOV—bilge seaman (Komi Rep.)

  11. Warrant Officer Vladimir SHABLATOV—electrical technician (Mari El Rep.)

  Compartment 5-bis

  1. Senior Lieutenant Vitaly KUZNETSOV—electrical service engineer (first) (Novgorod Reg.)

  2. Senior Warrant Officer Nail KHAFIZOV—chemical service senior instructor (Bashkortostan Rep.)

  3. Senior Warrant Officer Yevgeny GORBUNOV—diesel technician (Nizhny Novgorod Reg.)

  4. Warrant Officer Valery BAIBARIN—bilge team of damage-control division head (Chelyabinsk Reg.)

  Compartment 6

  1. *Captain-Lieutenant Rashid ARIAPOV—main propulsion assistant (Uzbekistan)

  2. Warrant Officer Aleksey BALANOV—bilge team of main propulsion division head (Chuvash Rep.)

  3. Senior Lieutenant Aleksey MITYAYEV—equipment party of main propulsion division engineer (St. Petersburg)

  4. *Chief Petty Officer Vyacheslav MAYNAGASHEV— bilge specialist (Khakass Rep.)

  5. *Seaman Aleksey KORKIN—bilge specialist (Arkhangelsk Reg.)

  Compartment 7

  1. *Captain-Lieutenant Dmitry KOLESNIKOV—technical group of main propulsion division commander (St. Petersburg)

  2. Warrant Officer Fanis ISHMURADOV—technical group technician (Bashkortostan Rep.)

  3. Petty Officer, 2nd Class, Vladimir SADOVOI—turbine unit commander (Nizhny Novgorod Reg.)

  4. *Seaman Roman KUBIKOV—turbine operator (Kursk Reg.)